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SEX DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT: WHAT HAS TITLE VII
ACCOMPLISHED FOR THE FEMALE?
I. INTRODUCTION
The legislative intent of Title VII' of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 2 was to
eradicate all forms of discriminatory employment practices based upon
race, religion, national origin or sex.3 While the initial success of accom-
plishing this goal fell short of what was expected,4 important strides in
recent years have reversed earlier disappointments.'
Title VII's impact was least perceptible in the elimination of sex-based
discrimination.' This was largely due to obstacles, both humanly created
and inherent,' in our society. Title VII's relative ineffectiveness in this
area, however, appears to be ending due to a greater social awareness on
the part of the courts' and some state legislatures.'" Many courts have
rendered decisions which indicate a realization that there is, in fact, a
place for women in a heretofore male oriented society." Some state legisla-
tures have ratified the Equal Rights Amendment to the United States
Constitution'2 and some have repealed their discriminatory "protective"
laws.'3
Virginia appears to be somewhere in the middle of the road on the issue
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-15 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-15 (Supp. 1972).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq. (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a et seq. (Supp. 1972).
3. See Note, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84
HARv. L. Rav. 1109, 1113-19 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 84 HARv. L. Rv. 1109].
4. See generally Draper, A Historical Sketch of the Major Labor Law Developments That
Have Occurred as a Result of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Activities of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, 18 How. L.J. 29 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 18 How.
L.J. 29]. See also 84 HARv. L. Rav. 1109, 1200-02.
5. See Comment, 48 TuL. L. REv. 125, 133-34 (1973).
6. See LAB. REL. REP., FEP, 421:601 (1973); 84 HARv. L. REv. 1109, 1199-1202.
7. This refers to state protective legislation enacted in the early 1900's to protect women
from hazardous positions. These laws today present a major obstacle to women in their
attempts to achieve employment equality.
The other humanly-created obstacle is the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification exception
to Title VII's proscription on sex discrimination. Both obstacles will be discussed infra.
8. The inherent obstacle is pregnancy which will be discussed infra.
9. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971); Diaz v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971);
Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969); Leblanc v. Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 333 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. La. 1971), aff'd 460 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1972).
10. While most states continue to maintain their state protective laws, other states such
as Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Virginia have either already repealed
theirs or are in the process of doing so.
11. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
12. H.R. JouR. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). Currently, 32 states have ratified the Equal
Rights Amendment; 38 states are required for constitutional ratification.
13. See note 10 supra.
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of sex discrimination. The General Assembly has refused to ratify the
Equal Rights Amendment, 4 but has amended one of Virginia's "protec-
tive", discriminatory laws.' The Virginia courts have generally supported
Victorian concepts concerning womens' role in society;"6 however, one re-
cent decision" indicates that such support might be diminishing.
This comment will explore various aspects of sex discrimination in em-
ployment with particular focus upon Title VII and its effects upon the
pregnant employee.
II. THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (EEOC)
Incorporated into Title VII is a provision'8 establishing the EEOC, an
agency whose primary function is administration and enforcement. How-
ever, when originally enacted, this provision proved debilitating since it
gave the EEOC virtually no support or enforcement power. The Commis-
sion was permitted only "informal methods of conference, conciliation, and
persuasion. '"" These methods had a limited effect in curtailing employer
discrimination since they essentially were a "soft words" suggestive ap-
proach rather than a "big stick" injunctive approach., The result was
adamant employer resistance, making enforcement of Title VII by the
Commission virtually impossible.'
In an attempt to counterbalance its own ineffectiveness, the Commis-
sion, pursuant to its authority to administer Title VII,12 issued guidelines
asserting its position on job discrimination based upon religion, national
origin, and sex. The Guidelines on Sex Discrimination are designed to
14. On Feb. 27, 1974, by a majority vote in the House Resolution Committee, it was decided
that the ERA resolution not be presented to the full House for ratification. It therefore died
in Committee.
15. VA. CODE ANN. § 45.1-32 (Cum. Supp. 1973) was amended to delete any reference to
women in its prohibition of working in mines and quarries. While this is a step in the right
direction, similar measures must also be taken to reform other protective sections, i.e., VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 40.1-34, -35 (Repl. Vol. 1970).
16. See, e.g., Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973), rev'd
sub nom., Board of Educ. v. LaFleur, 94 S. Ct. 791 (1974). While this was a circuit court
decision, the case and its facts arose in Virginia and developed through the Virginia courts.
17. Gilbert v. General Electric Co., LAB. REL. REP., 7 FEP Cases 796 (E.D. Va. April 13,
1974).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (4) (1964).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(a) (Supp. 1972).
20. See, e.g., Dent v. St. Louis-San Fran. Ry., 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969); Sciaraffa v.
Oxford Paper Co., 310 F. Supp. 891 (D. Me. S.D. 1970).
21. See 84 HARv. L. REV. 1109, 1200-02.




prohibit the disparate treatment of females in the employment field.
23 It
was not until 1972, however, that Congress, in an amendment to Title VII,
2
provided the Commission with effective and forceful remedies. This
amendment granted the Commission power to use the federal courts to
compel employers to comply with any voluntary agreement reached by
them and their employees concerning discriminatory practices.25 These
measures taken by the Commission and by the Congress have helped to
restructure the EEOC into a functioning body that can now adequately
cope with discriminatory sex practices in employment.
III. SEX DISCRIMINATION: OBSTACLES TO EQUALrrY
A. State Protective Laws
As originally contemplated, Title VII was to be promulgated absent the
word "sex." 6 Such an omission would have severely hampered women's
fight for equality in employment. But, as a result of last minute politick-
ing, "sex" was brought within its protective sphere.Y Inclusion of sex dis-
crimination was intended to provide women with the means of achieving
job equality in employment. However, attempts at achieving this equality
have been impeded by employers"8 who do not want to hire females to do
what they feel to be male oriented work, and by state legislators20 who
believe that the female must be protected from the hazards of industrial
work. Fortunately these prejudicial and over-protective attitudes do not
prevail in all jurisdictions."0
(a) The Commissions shall have the authority from time to time to issue, amend, or
rescind suitable procedural regulations to carry out the provisions of this subchap-
ter . ..
23. 29 C.F.R. § 1604 et seq. (1973). The Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex set
forth the Commission's viewpoint on various employment practices regarding sex discrimina-
tion. Examples of discriminatory policies are given and the premise that all employees are
to be treated as individuals, not classified by sex, is clearly stated.
These guidelines are accorded "great deference" by the Supreme Court. Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434 (1971).
24. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1)-(17) (Supp. 1972).
25. Id.; See also 18 How. L.J. 29, 31.
26. See LAB. REL. REP., FEP, 421:601 (1973); Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discrimination in
American Law III: Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20
HAST. L.J. 305, 310-13 (1968) [hereinafter cited as 20 HAST. L.J. 305].
27. See, e.g., Oldham, Sex Discrimination and State Protective Laws, 44 DEN. L.J. 344,
346 n.8 (1967).
28. See generally 48 TUL. L. REv. 125 (1973).
29. See Landau and Dunahoo, Sex Discrimination in Employment: A Survey of State and
Federal Remedies, 20 DRAKE L. REv. 417, 446-50 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 20 DRAKE L. Rv.
4171.
30. See, e.g., Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971); Rosenfeld v.
Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971); Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 325 F.
Supp. 467 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
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Discriminatory practices based on sex were derived from the stereotype
that women were physically incapable of performing a job with the same
efficiency and success as men.' Such practices were frequently defended
by employers on the more specific grounds that they were conforming to
an applicable state "protective" law.2 These protective laws were enacted
by individual states in the early 1900's in a gallant effort to insulate women
from many hazards created by industrial employment." Virginia was one
of the many states34 which passed laws barring employment of women in
extremely hazardous occupations,35 placing limitations upon the amount
of hours they could work38 and ceilings upon the amount of money they
could earn.3 The motive behind passage of these laws was benevolent, but,
society has advanced technically to the point where such protection is an
unnecessary and stultifying obstacle to the achievement of job equality for
women. Virginia, apparently realizing this fact, has repealed all but one
of its protective laws.3
The EEOC's Guidelines on Sex Discrimination provide that state pro-
tective laws do not take into account capacities, preferences, and the abili-
ties of individual women, and are therefore in conflict with and superceded
by Title VII. 9 Adherence to these guidelines by the courts coupled with
reform conscious state legislatures may permit Title VII to effectively elim-
inate one of the many obstacles to women's equality in employment.
31. Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971); 48 TuL. L. REv. 125, 126-
27 (1973).
32. See, e.g., Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Weeks v. South-
ern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Grabiec, 317
F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Ill. 1970).
33. See 20 DRAKE L. REv. 417, 446-47.
34. As of 1969, forty-one states had laws restricting the number of hours a woman could
work per day or per week; ten states had official restrictions on the amount of weight a woman
could lift; eighteen states prohibited or regulated night work in certain occupations; and
twenty-four states prohibited the employment of women in specific industries or occupations.
Some state laws have been repealed or superceded since 1969. See n. 10 supra. See also 48
TUL. L. REv. 125, 126-27 n. 11 (1973).
35. Among these occupations are quarrying, mining, coremaking, serving liquor, the clean-
ing of moving machinery, and occupations requiring constant standing.
Until 1972, Virginia forbade women from working in mines and quarries, but this law was
repealed in 1972. VA. CODE ANN. § 45.1-32 (Repl. Vol. 1972), as amended, VA. CODE ANN. §
45.1-32 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
36. These particular laws generally forbid a woman from working in excess of eight or ten
hours per day and forty-eight hours per week. This prohibition is covered in Virginia by VA.
CODE ANN. § 40.1-35 (Repl. Vol. 1970).
37. These laws set the minimum amount of money that a woman can earn, and establish
ceilings for her overtime pay. Such laws are not found in Virginia, however.
38. See note 15 supra.
39. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (1), (2) (1973).
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B. The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
The drafters of Title VII attached a qualification to its proscription
against discriminatory sex practices." This qualification, referred to as the
Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ),4' applies if an employer is
able to demonstrate that the position in question requires a particular sex
for its successful performance. If the BFOQ exception is deemed applica-
ble, the employer will not have violated Title VII, even though he hires
male employees exclusively.42
The problem with the BFOQ exception is its potential for abuse as a
euphemistic loophole within Title VII allowing people to be evaluated
solely upon their class status (female), rather than upon their individual
abilities and capacities. While such evaluation may be valid in a few
situations involving highly specialized occupations,43 the provision, if
broadly interpreted, could emasculate the effectiveness of Title VII in this
area. Employers have urged the broadest interpretation possible, but
courts have refused to oblige,4 knowing well that this would virtually halt
Title VI's inroads against sex discrimination.
The leading decisions concerning the interpretation of the BFOQ excep-
tion have been in accord with the apparent intent of its drafters and the
EEOC's Guidelines, i.e., narrow interpretation of the BFOQ.45 Ironically,
one such decision" dealt with a prospective male employee who sought the
position of flight cabin attendant with an airline. The airline refused to
hire him because he wasn't female, thus disregarding any qualifications
that he may have possessed. Defending a charge of reverse sex discrimina-
tion, the defendant airline contended that this position fell within the
BFOQ exception. In rejecting this contention, the court stated that the
exception applies only when discrimination based on sex goes to the
essence of the business operation, and such operation would be under-
mined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively; it should not, how-
40. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 110 CONG. REc. 2718 (1964).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 2(e) (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e- 2(e) (Supp. 1972).
42. See generally 49 NoTRE DAlim 568, 569 (1973).
43. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 110 CONG. REC. 2718, 2720, 7212-13 (1964) (examples
given were a female nurse in a nursing home, an all-male baseball team and a masseur).
44. Naturally a broad interpretation is favored by the employer since this would allow him
to discriminate because of sex with less legislative and governmental supervision in a variety
of situations.
45. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.) cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971) (where the court followed the EEOC guidelines in interpreting
the BFOQ exception narrowly).
46. See 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971); See also Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408
F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
1974]
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ever, apply if it is merely a convenience to the business operation. 7 The
court emphatically decreed that the only feasible interpretation was a
narrow one,48 as is advocated by the EEOC Guidelines. As the result of
such decisions,49 the courts have thus far prevented the BFOQ exception
from eroding Title VII's proscription against sex based discrimination in
employment.
C. Pregnancy
The employment practice most recently subjected to Title VII litigation
is sex discrimination against pregnant employees." Such practices are
manifested most frequently in policies either requiring the pregnant em-
ployee to take a leave of absence at a prescribed stage of the pregnancy, 5'
or in refusal by employers to allow sick leave and disability benefits."
Either practice is discriminatory; 3 the employer is in effect either telling
the pregnant employee that her condition has diminished her job effi-
ciency; or, by choosing to become pregnant, she is not entitled to receive
the same benefits given for other disabling conditions.
Forced maternity leave disputes often involve teachers, who, because of
the non-strenuous physical activities inherent in their position believe that
they are physically able to continue teaching beyond the forced leave date.
Those who attempt to stay on are faced with the difficult task of proving
that the forced leave policy constitutes discrimination based upon sex.
47. 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971).
48. Id. at 387.
49. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Kober v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 325 F. Supp. 467 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 325 F.
Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1971); Utility Workers Local 246 v. Southern Calif. Edison Co., 320
F. Supp. 1262 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
50. See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 42 U.S.L.W. 4905 (U.S. June 17, 1974); Board of Educ.
v. LaFleur, 94 S. Ct. 791 (1974); Buckley v. Coyle Public School System, 476 F.2d 92 (10th
Cir. 1973); Bravo v. Board of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. 111. 1972); Gilbert v. General
Electric Co., LAB. REL. REP., 7 FEP Cases 796 (E.D. Va. April 13, 1974); Vick v. Texas Empl.
Comm'n., 6 EPD T 8933 (S.D. Tex. 1973); Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wash.2d 195, 517 P.2d 599
(1974).
51. See Board of Educ. v. LaFleur, 94 S. Ct. 791 (1974); Buckley v. Doyle Public School
Sys., 476 F.2d 92 (10th Cir. 1973); Green v. Board of Educ., 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973);
Schattman v. Texas Empl. Comm'n., 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972); Heath v. Board of Educ.,
345 F. Supp. 501 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
52. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 42 U.S.L.W. 4905 (U.S. June 17, 1974); Gilbert v. General
Electric Co., LAB. REL. REp., 7 FEP Cases 796 (E.D. Va. April 13, 1974); Goodyear Tire and
Rubber Co. v. Rubber Workers Local 200, 7 EPD 9073 (Ct. of Common Pleas, Ohio Dec. 11,
1973); Dessenberg v. American Metal Forming Co., 6 EPD 8813 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 3, 1973).
53. One court has found however, that pregnancy is neither a sickness nor a disability;
therefore no benefits should be given for such a non-disability. Newmon v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., LAB. REL. REP., 7 FEP Cases 26 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
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Ordinarily, such a practice would be discriminatory and in violation of
Title VII following the EEOC Guidelines on Sex Discrimination. 4 How-
ever, until 1972 teachers as a class were excluded from Title VIl's protec-
tion.•r5 The aggrieved teacher was thus forced to by-pass any effective Title
VII remedies and file charges of discriminatory practices in a federal dis-
trict court. This avenue of relief required the teacher to premise allegations
upon violations of her Constitutional rights, i.e., a denial of due process or
a violation of equal protection under the fourteenth amendment. 6 There
has been little success in contesting discrimination on these grounds be-
cause of the rigorous standard of judicial review which the Supreme Court
applies in such cases." This standard, referred to as the "rational basis"
standard,58 places the burden upon the discriminatee to prove that the
alleged practices were arbitrary and capricious and not based upon a rea-
son which has a fair and substantial relation to a legitimate object of the
employer. 9 The burden is quite heavy, and often requires more evidence
than the discriminatee is capable of providing. Fortunately, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 19720 afforded a way to circumvent this
uphill route by amending Title VII to include teachers within its protec-
tion. Now the task of proving that a forced maternity leave is sex discrimi-
nation under Title VII is less arduous for the employee because the burden
of proof is placed on the employer.6 '
Refusal to grant sick leave and disability benefits to the pregnant em-
ployee was the issue before the Eastern District Court of Virginia in Gilbert
54. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 et seq. (1973), which proscribes any written or unwritten policy
which discriminates against employees because of pregnancy.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1964).
56. See 49 NoTRE DAME 568, 574 (1973).
57. See Id. 574-77; 48 Tu.. L. Ray. 125, 128-30 (1973).
While never applied by a majority of the Supreme Court, some courts have applied the
more active or strict scrutiny standard, which places the burden upon the employer or govern-
ment to show that classifications based on sex are inherently suspect and therefore there is a
compelling state interest to maintain such classifications, thus sustaining the constitution-
ality of the policy or regulation in question. See, e.g., Buckley v. Coyle Public School Sys.,
476 F.2d 92 (10th Cir. 1973); Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Calif. 1973).
58. This standard has also been referred to as the "traditional standard" or the "permissive
review."
59. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971), where the majority enunciated the "rational
basis" standard for sex based discrimination.
60. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e (b), 2000e-1 (1972), amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e (b), 20OOe-1
(1964).
61. See, e.g., Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Weeks v. South-
ern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
1974]
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v. General Electric Co. 3 The court found that pregnant employees of Gen-
eral Electric were forced to bear economic hardship simply because they
chose to exercise their innate right to bear a child. 4 On the other hand,
male employees under General Electric's health plan were able to subject
themselves to as selective an operation as a vasectomy or cosmetic surgery
and still receive appropriate sickness and disability benefits."
In defense of its policy to isolate the pregnant employee, General Electric
raised two principal arguments; first, that inclusion of pregnancy related
disabilities within the overall health plan would make the cost so high that
the plan would be infeasible. Second, because pregnancy is a voluntary
disability, it should not be protected. The court rejected General Electric's
first argument by stating that the pregnant employee could be precluded
from the plan only if it was an essential business necessity." Such a busi-
ness necessity was absent here since General Electric could have reduced
the cost of the plan in a number of possible ways. 7 In rejecting the second
argument, the court determined that it lacked consistency in light of Gen-
eral Electric's policy of providing benefits for all disabilities including
those arising from attempted suicides.68
In rendering this decision, the court accorded great deference to both the
earlier EEOC decision on this case and the EEOC's 1972 Guidelines which
denounce any pregnancy related discrimination 9 and place pregnancy
within the same ambit as all other temporary disabilities covered by health
plans. 0 In short, the court found that because the plan was purportedly
designed to relieve the economic burden of physical incapacity, pregnancy,




66. Id.; Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 796 (4th Cir. 1971), wherein the court
agreed with a prior fourth circuit decision and stated that the test is whether there exists an
overriding legitimate business purpose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and
efficient operation of the business. See also Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d
245 (10th Cir. 1970).
67. Gilbert v. General Electric Co., LAB. REL. REP., 7 FEP Cases 796, 810 (E.D. Va. April
13, 1974).
68. Id.
69. The case was decided by the EEOC. Gilbert v. General Electric, No. 3-093 (May 18,
1973); wherein the Commission, following its investigation, concluded that the health plan
was violative of Title VII.
The EEOC Guidelines referred to were issued on March 3, 1972, and provide:
Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion, childbirth
and recovery therefrom are, for all job-related purposes, temporary disabilities and
should be treated as such under any health or temporary disability insurance or sick
leave plan available in connection with employment. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (b) (1972).
70. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (b) (1972).
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obviously a sex-linked disability, should not be isolated for less favorable
treatment;7' to do so would clearly constitute discrimination based on sex
in violation of Title VII.
The Gilbert decision illustrates that the Title VII alternative to elimina-
tion of sex discrimination can be more successful than the constitutional
approach.72 The Title VII approach in simplified terms consists of filing
charges with the EEOC stating that alleged unlawful practices were com-
mitted by the employer. The EEOC then conducts a thorough investiga-
tion of the charges. Upon a finding of a violation based upon the presented
facts, the EEOC issues a compliance order to the employer. If the employer
fails to comply within the prescribed period of time, the EEOC files an
action in the appropriate district court on behalf of the employee.7 3 When
the case is brought to this level the burden of proof shifts and the employer
must justify his actions. If he fails to adequately do so, he is found guilty
of a Title VII violation.7 4 Utilization of this procedure by female employees
will insure that they will not be penalized for suffering disabilities to which
they alone are inherently susceptible.
IV. CONCLUSION
Title VII is steadily developing into the most effective device in the
struggle to eradicate all forms of sex based discrimination in employment.
Its procedural accessibility and great potential for success makes it a most
desirable tool with which females may combat sex discrimination.71 Under
71. Gilbert v. General Electric Co., LAB. REL. REP., 7 FEP Cases 796, 809 (E.D. Va. April
13, 1974).
72. The same result was reached in Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146
(W.D. Pa. 1974); Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Rubber Workers Local 200, LAB. REL. REP.,
8 FEP Cases 128 (Ohio Ct. App., Dec. 11, 1973); Dessenberg v. American Metal Forming Co.
LAB. REL. REP., 8 FEP Cases 290 (N.D. Ohio, Oct. 3, 1973). Contra, Newmon v. Delta Airlines,
LAB. REL. REP., 7 FEP Cases 26 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
73. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 et seq. (1972), amending, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 et seq. (1964).
74. See note 63 supra.
75. The ease of accessibility results because the discriminatee only has to file a charge of
discrimination against the employer with the Commission. The discriminatee need only
present the facts as they occurred. From this point in time, it is the Commission that initiates
all further actions. The Commission makes the necessary investigation, determines the guilt
of the employer and then issues the compliance order. If the employer refuses to comply, the
Commission then files suit in the appropriate federal district court on behalf of the discrimi-
natee. Once in federal court, the burden rests with the employer to justify his actions. Failure
to do so results in a violation of Title VII.
Obviously this approach is less expensive for the discriminatee since there is no need to
hire an attorney on her behalf nor does she bear the necessary costs for initiating court action.
Because the employer bears the burden of proof when the Commission brings the action,
success for the discriminatee is often a foregone conclusion.
19741
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Title VII, no longer must the discriminatee travel the more burdensome
route of combating sex discrimination on constitutional grounds."6
If Title VII continues to succeed, it may conceivably surpass the results
envisioned by the supporters of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment."
This is because the ERA, while seemingly broad,"8 fails to proscribe sex
discrimination where it most frequently occurs, in the private sector.7 1
Title VII should, therefore, remain the single most effective means to at-
tack sex discrimination in employment, regardless of ratification of the
ERA.
H.L.K.
76. See text at note 8 supra.
77. These results are, obviously, the complete eradication of sex discrimination.
78. The proposed Amendment provides:
Section 1. Equality of Rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex. H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971); S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
79. See Comment, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 133, n.77 at 150 (1973).
